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Taste for exclusivity and intellectual property rights⇤
Dominik Grafenhofer†and Christian Kiedaisch‡
October 1, 2011
Abstract
This article analyzes the e↵ects of intellectual property rights protection on innova-
tion in a quality-ladder model in which part of the consumers value being the exclusive
consumers of the newest generation of a good. In the case of a monopoly innovator, we
show that reducing IP protection can increase the average innovation rate by regularly
destroying exclusivity and thereby creating incentives to invent new exclusive goods. In
the case where R&D is undertaken by entrants, the innovation rate, however, increases
in the strength of IP protection for most market structures. In each case, we derive the
welfare-maximizing strength of IP protection.
1 Introduction
In industries that produce high-tech gadgets like smartphones or tablets, but also in the
fashion industry, positional preferences seem to play an important role and consumers not
only value the quality of goods but at the same time use consumption in order to signal their
type. In this paper we study interactions between such kind of preferences and the e↵ects that
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection has on innovation. We analyze this question in
a quality-ladder model in which part of the consumers (high-type agents) value being the
exclusive consumers of the newest generation of the good, i.e. in which they have a taste for
exclusivity1. In the case where high-type agents consume the same quality of the good as the
remaining part of the population (low-type agents), they do not get an exclusivity premium
⇤We are grateful to Jean Tirole, Christopher Sprigman, Michael Meurer, Kai Konrad and seminar/ work-
shop participants at ETH Zu¨rich and in Wildbad Kreuth for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual
disclaimer applies. Dominik Grafenhofer acknowledges financial support by the NSF (NSF Grant Patent pools
and biomedical innovation, Award No. 0830288).
†Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, grafenhofer@coll.mpg.de
‡University of Zu¨rich, Department of Economics, christian.kiedaisch@econ.uzh.ch
1The Apple products iPhone and iPad might serve as good examples, as they are often seen as
status symbols, especially among young people. In order to obtain the newest versions of these
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and we assume that agents of both groups value the good in the same way. (Re)Establishing
exclusivity provides additional incentives to innovators, which provides a new reason, why
limited IP protection may be growth and welfare enhancing. In section 2 we describe this
type of preferences in detail and discuss how they can be derived from a simple matching
model. Moreover, we show that a monopoly provider of a good may find it profitable to sell
this good exclusively to the high types even when exclusive consumption is not e cient. If
imitation of the newest good is prevented by IPRs, it is exclusively sold to high-type agents
and low-type agents consume the second-newest version of the good at a lower price. When
IP protection on the newest good expires, imitation pushes prices of this good down (to zero),
so that both types of agents can a↵ord to consume it.
In section 3 we study the case of a monopoly innovator. We show that incremental profits
from obtaining the next innovation are larger in the case where IP protection on the currently
newest version of the good has expired than in the case where it is still protected by IPRs,
as the monopolist can only extract the exclusivity premium in the first case. In this setting,
reducing the strength of IP protection has two e↵ects: it on the one hand reduces innovation
incentives by reducing the expected time during which monopoly profits can be earned, but
on the other hand makes it more likely that the economy is in the state where IP protection
has expired and where innovation incentives are particularly high. We find that under certain
conditions, the second“composition”e↵ect is so strong that average growth is maximal for an
intermediate strength of IP protection. The monopoly innovator can therefore be pushed to
innovate more if the exclusivity provided by his goods is regularly destroyed due to expiring
IP protection. As we assume that incremental profits are independent of the size of the lead
if there is no taste for exclusivity, this result is purely driven by the taste for exclusivity and
not due to a standard Arrow-replacement e↵ect.
We also analyze the e↵ect of the strength of IP protection on inter-temporal welfare and
show that reducing IP protection below the maximal level is optimal if either the static
welfare loss arising from exclusivity is large enough or if the reduction in IP protection
increases growth and if at the same time R&D leads to large enough positive externalities. It
should be noted that within this setting, the trade-o↵ associated with IP protection has some
unusual features. On the one hand, a reduction in the strength of IP protection can increase
innovation and on the other hand the exclusivity provided by IP protection might be socially
desirable, meaning that there are no static dead-weight losses but gains from excluding some
goods and to be “ahead of the crowd”, some people spend a considerable amount of money and wait-
ing time lining up in front of stores (see for example: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/22/
uk-apple-china-consumers-idUSLNE76L01C20110722 (cache: http://www.webcitation.org/60Xkei16Z)).
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of the consumers through monopoly pricing. While static ine ciencies usually result from
the fact that monopolists cannot engage in perfect price discrimination, a novel feature in
our model is that exclusion can arise even if monopolists can engage in such discrimination2.
When there is no taste for exclusivity, full IP protection maximizes growth and welfare in
our model.
In the case where R&D is undertaken by entrants (section 4), the e↵ect of IP protection
on average growth depends on the market structure and can be either positive or negative.
However, full IP protection maximizes growth for reasonable choices of the market structure3.
This is the case because entry itself allows to grasp the rents from selling exclusively to high-
type agents and because for most market structures, incremental profits from entering are
not higher in the case where IP protection on the currently newest generation of the good
has expired. Therefore, expiration of IP protection on the currently newest generation of the
good does not increase incentives to innovate and average growth in these settings. However,
reducing IP protection below the maximal level can nevertheless increase social welfare if
growth is otherwise excessive or if exclusivity is associated with static welfare losses.
Our main results are robust in a more general setting in which high type agents also
have a higher willingness to pay for the good (see section 5). In this case we also look at
the possibility of network e↵ects, meaning that instead of having a preference for exclusivity
agents benefit from consuming the same good as the other group. In the case of a monopoly
innovator who prefers to sell exclusively to the high types (due to their higher willingness
to pay), we show that reducing IP protection is particularly harmful for innovation: The
reason for that is that incremental profits are larger in the case where the currently newest
generation of the good is protected by IPRs than in the case where IP protection on it has
expired, as in the latter case the high type consumers have to be incentivized to give up
consuming the public domain good which is associated with positive network e↵ects.
Apart from the implications already discussed, the presence of agents with a taste for
exclusivity allows for product di↵erentiation in a model with unit consumption of a quality
good, constant marginal costs and quasi-linear preferences of consumers. If there is no taste
for exclusivity but if instead agents di↵er with respect to their willingness to pay, monopolists
do not engage in quality di↵erentiation in such a setting as we show in appendix C.
2This clearly is the case if there is pure taste for exclusivity, but might be di↵erent in a matching model.
3We could only find a similar e↵ect as in the monopoly case in a sequential price game.
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Related literature
Raustiala and Sprigman (2006) discuss the importance of positional preferences in the fashion
industry and claim that low IP protection leads to a faster fashion cycle by accelerating a
process of induced obsolescence. They argue that “more fashion goods are consumed in a
low-IP world than would be consumed in a world of high IP protection precisely because
copying rapidly reduces the status premium conveyed by new apparel and accessory designs,
leading status-seekers to renew the hunt for the next new thing” (p. 1733). In our model, we
try to analyze these mechanisms in more detail and find that the arguments apply well to
the case of a monopoly innovator, in which average growth is maximal for an intermediate
strength of IP protection. While Raustiala and Sprigman (2006) claim that these processes
might actually help designers and the industry as a whole, in our model a reduction of IP
protection reduces profits of the monopoly innovator but leads to the creation of more R&D
jobs. In the case where entrants introduce a new good, we find that in most cases innovation
is encouraged by stronger IP protection, which is not in line with the arguments of Raustiala
and Sprigman (2006).
Pesendorfer (1995) studies fashion cycles in which designs are used as signaling devices
in a matching game. There is no growth in his model, but the lack of a possibility to commit
to charging a certain price for the design in the future creates an incentive for a designer
to sell a certain design to a broader and broader population over time, which renders the
design obsolete over time and thus induces the designer to introduce a new design. In his
model, designs are durable goods, while in this article we study consumables (for which there
are no commitment issues associated with inter-temporal price setting) in order to put the
emphasis on the role of IP protection.
In the case of a monopoly innovator, Horowitz and Lai (1996) and Cadot and Lipp-
man (1995) also find that average growth is maximal for an intermediate patent length. In
Horowitz and Lai (1996) per period profits of the leading firm are larger the farther it has
escaped from the competitive fringe through innovation. However, the Arrow replacement
e↵ect implies that marginal profits and therefore also innovation incentives decrease in the
size of the lead. In Cadot and Lippman (1995) profit flows are assumed to decrease over
time due to saturation so that innovation which restores the initial level of profits is again
most profitable in the state where patents have expired. Kiedaisch (2011) also derives an
inverted-U relation between the strength of IP protection and average growth in a setting
where the Arrow replacement e↵ect is at work. However, he considers a more general case
where also entrants are capable of carrying out R&D but where due to the possibility of
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preemption, only the incumbent firm innovates in equilibrium. The main di↵erence between
these articles and ours is therefore the mechanism due to which marginal profits decrease in
the size of the lead. In our model, there is no Arrow replacement e↵ect as marginal profits
are assumed to be independent of the size of the lead, but the taste for exclusivity creates a
new “replacement e↵ect” which works in the same direction.
Several articles have analyzed patent policies in the case where entrants innovate and
in which there is leapfrogging. The role of forward protection is analyzed by O’ Donoghue,
Scotchmer and Thisse (1998), O’ Donoghue and Zweimu¨ller (2004) and Chu (2009) and the
role of a patentability requirement by O’ Donoghue (1998), O’ Donoghue and Zweimu¨ller
(2004) and Hunt (2004). Kiedaisch (2011) analyzes these policies in the case of persistent
leadership. We do not consider these issues and focus on the case where the size of an
innovative step is exogenously given and where there is no protection against replacement
by follow-on innovators in the form of forward protection. In standard quality-ladder models
with free entry into R&D like the one of Aghion and Howitt (1992), patent protection against
imitation (in the absence of forward protection) enhances growth so that growth is maximal
for infinitely lived patents. In our model, the introduction of a taste for exclusivity can,
however, lead to cases in which this result does not hold anymore. Acemoglu and Akcigit
(2011) analyze a model in which there are two competing firms in each industry and in which
the laggard first has to engage in duplicative (but non-infringing) catch-up R&D before he
can do frontier R&D. They show that in order to stimulate growth, patent protection should
be stronger for firms that have a larger lead over their rivals. Also Bessen and Maskin (2009)
analyze the case in which there are only two firms in each industry. Assuming that patents
grant some blocking power over future innovations and that licensing markets are incomplete,
they show that innovation and welfare (even for innovators) can be larger in the case without
than in the case with patent protection if firms can appropriate some surplus even without
patents. A di↵erence in our model is therefore that entrants can directly conduct frontier
R&D (without the need to catch up first or to pay licensing fees to the incumbent) and
that in the case of patent expiration, profits fall to zero. But more importantly, the market
structure and pricing game is di↵erent in our setting and more involved than in the other
models where there is either a simple limit pricing equilibrium or where innovations are
drastic or even lead to the introduction of new goods, so that there is no replacement (the
latter is assumed by Bessen and Maskin (2009)).
Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2010) study the case where innovators can either cumulatively
improve the quality of existing goods or introduce new product lines and analyze how patent
policy a↵ects the allocation of R&D by rewarding initial versus follow-on innovators. Hopen-
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hayn, Llobet and Mitchell (2006) use a mechanism design approach and propose a patent
buyout scheme in order to e↵ectively stimulate cumulative innovation in a context where
entrants innovate and where the patent o ce cannot observe the size of the inventive step.
2 Taste for exclusivity
2.1 The model
There is a good the quality of which can be increased step-by-step through innovation, and
a unit mass of agents who consume one or zero unit of the good each period, where time
is assumed to be continuous. Consuming a low-quality version in addition to a high-quality
version does not increase utility so that only one quality version of the good is consumed
by a given agent. There are two types of agents: the fraction   2 (0, 1) of the population
are high-type agents with a taste for exclusivity, meaning that the utility they derive from
consuming the good depends on whether they consume it exclusively. The remaining fraction
of agents are low-types who only care about their own consumption. Low-type agents have
a willingness to pay UL(k) = k for consuming the good of quality k in period t (the k-th
good that was invented). The high-type agents’ willingness to pay for quality k given that
low-type agents only consume goods of index i  k  1 is UH(k) = k+  (with   > 0). But
when low-type agents consume goods of quality i   k as well, the willingness to pay of the
high type agents drops to UH(k) = k. Once a good has been invented, it can be produced
at a cost of zero. An invention (that improves the quality of the good from k   1 to k)
can be attained with hazard rate   if R&D costs C( ) = c↵( )
↵ are incurred, where c > 0
and ↵   1. Due to reasons of tractability, we only consider the cases of constant returns
(↵ = 1) and of a quadratic R&D cost function4 (↵ = 2). In order to obtain simple bang-bang
solutions in the case of constant returns (↵ = 1), we assume that there is an upper bound  m
which the innovation rate cannot surpass due to technological reasons. A successful innovator
obtains IP protection on the invented version of the good which prevents others from copying
the same version. However, this protection expires with hazard rate     0, in which case
competitors are allowed to produce the same good at a cost of zero as well. For simplicity, it
is assumed that protection for all existing IPRs simultaneously expires with hazard rate   in
which case the innovator loses all his monopoly power5.   can be interpreted as an inverse
4This case is supposed to represent the more general case where the R&D cost function is convex and
satisfies the INADA conditions.
5We therefore do not consider the possibility that relatively older IPRs expire before newer ones, in which
case the monopoly power would be reduced without being completely terminated.
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measure of the length of IP protection (e.g. patent length) or of the strength of protection
against imitators who try to enter the market with substitute products. But the analysis also
more generally applies to cases in which appropriability is attained through trade secrecy or
lead time. In these cases a higher   implies a shorter lead time or less trade secrecy6. The
rate of interest is exogenous and given by r and innovators are assumed to be risk neutral
and to maximize expected profits.
The preferences of high-type agents are non-standard. A straight-forward justification
may be conspicuous consumption, e.g. that high-type agents derive additional utility from
elitist or snobbish behavior. This case is discussed in Corneo and Jeanne (1997), where the
consumption of a certain good is used to signal wealth in order to improve social status.
The additional utility   could also be interpreted as a taste for novelty when the high types
simply like to be among the first to exclusively consume a certain new good or service and to
be ahead of the crowd7. An alternative foundation for these preferences can originate from
a matching model in which there are two types of agents (high-type and low-type) and in
which the latest version of the good is used as a signaling device.
In order to determine the optimal policy we need to know the impact of exclusive con-
sumption on welfare. Up to now we did not exclude the possibility that the incremental
utility that agents derive from consuming a good is higher than their maximal willingness to
pay. But when   is a pure taste for novelty or snobbism, willingness to pay and (incremen-
tal) utility coincide. When all agents consume the highest quality level k available in a given
period, intra-period gross consumer surplus is given by Wn(k) = k. The second case we con-
sider is when high-type agents consume the latest available version k of the good exclusively,
while low-type agents consume the second-newest version k   1 only. Then, gross consumer
surplus is given by We(k) = k   1 +  (1 +  ). A higher degree of di↵erentiation will not
occur in the analysis to come. Exclusivity is e cient if the taste for exclusive consumption
  is high enough, i.e. if  (1 + ) > 1.
In Corneo and Jeanne (1997) improvements in the social status of one group come at
the cost of the other group so that signaling is a zero-sum game in their setup. Under these
circumstances gross consumer surplus is given byWn(k) = k(+constant) under non-exclusive
6We do not consider the case where IPRs protect against replacement by follow-on innovators (forward
protection). Therefore, an innovator who invents a new generation of the good ( which increases utility by
one) neither needs to compensate previous innovators nor receives any compensation when his product is
pushed out of the market due to follow-on innovation. An improved version of the good might in fact be
very similar to the previous version and an innovation might simply consist of adding a new component to
an otherwise unchanged product (e.g. a new generation of a smartphone might simply consist of the previous
generation with some added features).
7For these preferences to arise it is not even necessary that consumption is publicly observable as simply
knowing to be an early adopter might increase the utility of high-type agents.
7
consumption and byWn(k) = k (1  )(+constant) when only high-types consume the latest
version of the good. Exclusive consumption is always decreasing gross consumer surplus in
this setting, because there is no social gain from the signaling function of consumption, but
social losses due to the fact that low types are excluded from the consumption of the latest
good.
In order to allow for di↵erent interpretations of the taste for exclusivity, we consider a
general instantaneous gross consumer surplus function
Wn(k) = k + wn and We(k) = k + we
in the cases of nonexclusive (n) and exclusive consumption (e). Inter-temporal gross consumer
surplus is given by
R1
t=t0
e r(t t0)W (t) dt whereW (t) is consumer surplus in period t and r > 0
is the agents’ inter-temporal discount rate. This rate is assumed to be equal to the interest
rate. In order to obtain inter-temporal welfare we still need to take the innovation process
and R&D costs into account, which we will do at a later stage.
2.2 The assortative matching case
We consider a matching model along the lines of Pesendorfer (1995), but focus on a non-
durable good in a one-period setting. This rules out fashion cycles as they appear in Pe-
sendorfer (1995). The second deviation is that we consider the case where the good that is
used as a screening device also has a value on its own apart from signaling purposes. High-
and low-type agents form pairwise matches, which create a surplus shared evenly between the
matched agents. Matches between low-type agents are normed to yield no surplus. Mixed
matches between a high-type and a low-type agents create a per-agent surplus of   > 0, while
high-type agents derive (instantaneous) utility   +   from being matched with other high-
type agents. We assume that single-crossing holds, i.e. that      , so that the willingness to
pay for being matched with high-type agents is higher for high-type agents than for low-type
agents. It is well known that assortative matching (in pairs) is socially e cient if and only
if single-crossing holds. When types are public information, competition leads to (positive)
assortative matching, as no low-type agent finds it profitable to buy himself into a match
with a high-type agent, who would ask for a compensation of   which is higher than  , the
low-type’s willingness to pay for the match.
Now suppose that information on types is private information and that no verifiable proof
can be provided before matches take place. When a signaling device is lacking, random
matching occurs. However, high-type agents can coordinate on using a certain good as a
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signaling device. Their willingness to pay for the good then exceeds its consumption value
by   given that it is only consumed by high-type agents, because it assures them to be
matched with other high-type agents. Low-type agents then only want to pay an additional
  for the respective good. When the consumption valuation of the good, which without
loss of generality we normalize to 1, is the same for both types, we can compute the welfare
change due to the use of the good for signaling purposes. When all agents consume the good,
welfare is the sum of the consumption valuation of all agents plus the returns from random
matching:
wn = 1 + 2 (1   )  +  2( +  )
In the case of exclusive consumption only high-type agents consume the good, and use it as
a signaling device, which is why only high-types contribute to welfare:
we =  (1 + +  )
From this we get the welfare gain (or loss if negative) from using consumption of the good
as a signaling device:
we   wn =  (1   )(    )  (1   )
The first term in brackets is the social gain from assortative matching, while the second
one denotes the social loss from low-types being excluded from consumption. It is easy
to see8 that exclusive consumption may or may not be socially e cient depending on the
parameter values: For low   the gains from e cient matching are too low to compensate
for the forgone surplus from consumption of low types, while for large   the opposite is the
case, i.e. exclusive consumption is e cient. But it should be pointed out that in both cases
using the good for the purpose of e cient matching comes at a social cost (by excluding part
of the population from consumption of the good).
We now compare the socially optimal provision of exclusivity to the behavior of a
monopoly provider of the good. The monopolist has two options as well9: Serving all agents
yields a profit of 1, because this is the highest price such that all agents would like to consume
the product10. The second option is to sell only to high-types and to let the good become a
coordination device for these agents. Di↵erent equilibrium prices between 1 +    and 1 + 
8Note that the welfare di↵erence is linear and increasing in  .
9In fact the monopolist could sell to high-type agents and a fraction of low-type agents. We exclude this
case by assuming that   is small enough to render this behavior unprofitable.
10Note that in this case consumption cannot be used as a signal so that the expected surplus from random
matching is independent of consumption.
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may prevail in this case11. We suppose that the monopolist may coordinate high-type agents
to buy at the price 1 + , which generates the highest profits of  (1 + ). The monopolist
charges high-type agents their willingness to pay for being matched with a high-type rather
than a low-type agent   on top of the consumption value. Hence, the monopolist prefers to
sell exclusively to high-types if and only if  (1 + ) > 1.
If we rewrite the welfare di↵erential
we   wn =  (1 + )  1   [(1   )  +   ]| {z }
>0
,
we see that the gain of the monopolist is larger than the welfare gain from the use of the
good for the purpose of conspicuous consumption. Therefore, we have proven the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. If the use of a good as a signaling device in the matching game is socially
e cient, it is always profitable for the monopolist to establish the good as such a device given
that he is able to set a price equal to 1+ . The converse is not true, such that the monopolist
may find it profitable to sell the good exclusively only to high types even if it is not socially
preferable.
The intuition for this result is, that while the monopolist fully extracts the additional
matching premium from high-type agents, he does not have to compensate for the loss of low-
types matched by chance to high-type agents. On top of that, the monopolist can extract  
even from those high-type agents who would have been matched by chance with other high-
type agents anyway under random matching. This is the reason why in the case where   is
small or even zero the monopolist still has too high incentives to sell exclusively compared
to the social optimum.
The feasibility of charging price 1 +  relies on the coordination of all high-type agents
on consuming the good. If they could jointly decide to not consume the good, they would be
better o↵ as they could then still get an expected surplus larger than  . The highest price
which is robust to this kind of deviation can be determined as 1 +   +     p      +  ,
where the left-hand side denotes the utility of a high type when the high types coordinate
on buying the good while the right-hand side denotes the utility from not consuming the
good and from being randomly matched. This price is given by p = 1 + (1    ) . For this
11Clearly even high-type agents would never want to buy the good at a price higher than 1 + . At prices
lower than 1+   low-type agents would also consume the good in order to be matched with high-type agents.
In between all prices can prevail in a separating equilibrium depending on the coordination between high-type
agents.
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equilibrium, proposition 1 holds as well, as the profit di↵erential between selling exclusively
and not selling exclusively is given by (1   )(    1)  1 and is still larger than the welfare
gain from exclusivity. It should, however, be noted that there are other equilibria with very
low prices in which the implications of Proposition 1 are reversed.
Finally, we would like to relate these results to our original quality good: Both types derive
utility k from consuming a unit of the good of quality k. But additionally, the highest-quality
good can be used as a signaling device: Each period agents match into pairs. These matches
are short-lived, i.e. they only last for a single (infinitesimal) period.
If information on types is private and no signaling device is used or available, matches
are random and the willingness to pay for a good of quality k is k. Now consider that two
goods of the two qualities k and k   1 are sold at a price di↵erential strictly larger than
1 +   and smaller than 1 + . Then, low-type agents willing to buy good k   1 do not want
to buy quality k. However, high-type agents can coordinate to use good k as a signaling
device in the matching market. Thus, if the quality level of the good consumed by a given
agent is publicly observable, high-types are able to match with each other based on the
observable quality of the good consumed. Hence, there is an equilibrium of the matching
game, which reproduces the taste for exclusivity preferences12. The results on the social
e ciency of assortative matching and proposition 1 (which only has to be reinterpreted as
a statement about product di↵erentiation versus non-di↵erentiation) carry over immediately
to the quality good case, although they then reduce to intra-period statements.
2.3 Functional alibi
Two questions remain: Why do high-type agents use an ordinary (quality) good for signaling
proposes if they could instead use the consumption of a scarce but otherwise worthless good
(e.g. some expensive and unique cloth) to signal their type? Why do they use the highest
quality version of the good for signaling purposes?
Coincidentally, both questions can be answered by employing the same argument. Sig-
naling can involve social stigma, as usually people do not want to be seen as showing o↵.
This social stigma can be higher than the gains of signaling via matching, which rules out
e.g. the use of a rare cloth as a signaling device. For conspicuous consumption to take place,
some kind of excuse or alibi is needed in order to reduce social stigma. This excuse can come
about via a third type of agents who have a higher consumption valuation of the good than
12Note that high-type agents still have a positive expected gain from being randomly matched with another
high-type agent. But this additional utility is unrelated to the consumption of the quality good so that the
high- types utility from non-exclusive consumption of version k of the good stays k.
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the rest of the population (including high-type ones), but who do not care (at least not as
much as high-types) about matching. When the high-types and this third type of agents
both consume the good, social stigma may drop enough to make it profitable for high-type
agents to use the good for signaling proposes.
One can add this feature to the matching model in an ad-hoc way. However we refrain
from going into the details in this paper, and leave a rigorous treatment of this question to
future research.
3 Monopoly innovator
Suppose that we face an industry in which there is a monopoly innovator who is able to
improve his product via step-by-step innovation. The innovator has monopoly power over
the part of the product line for which he has IP protection.
Now consider the product-line choice of the innovator in a certain period. When all IPRs
have expired, competitors can supply the newest good at zero cost, which drives its price
down to zero. All agents therefore consume the highest quality good invented, so that there
is no product di↵erentiation. Now suppose that IPRs up to quality-level h have expired,
so that all goods with index i  h are in the public domain, but that the innovator has
improved the quality-level of the good up to k > h (after the period in which all IPRs have
expired). In this situation, the monopolist can therefore charge a price p = k   h for the
newest good k from both types of agents in the case of no product di↵erentiation. Profits
are then given by k h as well. When the newest product is only sold to high-type agents he
can charge pH = k +   h from the high-type agents if good k is sold exclusively to them.
He can then still sell version k   1 to low-type agents at price pL = k   1  h. In this case,
the corresponding profits are given by k   1  h+  (1 + ). From now on we only consider
the case in which the innovator would like to engage in product di↵erentiation13, for which
there is a straight-forward (su cient and necessary) condition:
Assumption 1. When k > h a monopoly innovator always wants to quality di↵erentiate
between the two types of agents, i.e.
 (1 + ) > 1 .
13If the innovator chooses to sell the same product to both types, the taste for exclusivity plays no role
in future considerations, and the model collapses to a standard growth model. Growth and welfare are then
maximal for full IP protection.
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Note that this assumption implies that the monopolist wants to engage in quality di↵er-
entiation even if he could perfectly price discriminate between the two types of agents. It
is therefore not a standard case of quality di↵erentiation and the driving force is the inter-
dependence of preferences and not asymmetric information about the willingness’ to pay of
di↵erent agents. Given this assumption, we can compare incremental profits from inventing
the next quality level of the good: Developing version k+1 of the good increases profit flows
by 1 if k > h and by  (1 +  ) > 1 if k = h, that means in the case where the currently
newest version of the good is in the public domain and as long as IP protection on these
newly developed goods does not expire. It should be noted that the standard Arrow replace-
ment e↵ect due to which profits decrease in the size of the lead is not present in this model.
However, marginal profits are higher if the currently newest version of the good is in the
public domain as in this case the innovator can extract an exclusivity premium.
3.1 The impact of IP protection on growth
As the incentives of the monopolist to invest in R&D depend on whether he has a lead
relative to the competitive fringe, the innovation rate depends on the lead which changes
over time due to innovation and expiring IP protection. Hence, the variable we are interested
in is the average rate of innovation or average growth. On the one hand, we observe that
incremental profit flows are higher when all existing IPRs have expired than in the case where
the innovator has already established a lead vis-a`-vis the competitive fringe. On the other
hand, the value of an innovation increases in the strength of IP protection (decreases in  ),
so that it is not a priory clear whether an increase in IP protection increases or decreases
average growth. Taking     0 as given, let us denote the value of an innovation for the
monopolist by Ve( ) =
1
r+  if k > h and by Vn( ) =
 (1+ )
r+  > Ve( ) if k = h. The expected
return to R&D at a given point in time is then given by  Vi   c( ).
In the case of a linear R&D cost function we have two trivial cases: When c > Vn(0),
the cost of innovation is too high for any level of IP protection (c > Vn(0) > Vn( ) > Ve( )
holds for all  ) so that the monopolist does not innovate. The other trivial case arises when
c < Ve(0) as the innovator always chooses the maximal rate of innovation  m under full IP
protection, that means if   = 0. In this case, average growth is also given by  m. The more
interesting case is the one where Vn(0) > c > Ve(0), so that the monopolist only finds it
worthwhile to undertake R&D if k = h, that means if all his IPRs have expired.
Proposition 2. When the monopolist does not carry out product di↵erentiation, full IP
protection maximizes growth. In the opposite case (when assumption 1 holds), imperfect IP
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protection maximizes growth in the following cases:
1. Linear R&D cost: For Vn(0) > c > Ve(0) growth is maximal for an intermediate level
of IP protection
 ⇤ =
 (1 + )
c
  r > 0 .
The corresponding average growth rate is given by
 ⇤ =
 ⇤ m
 m +  ⇤
.
2. Quadratic R&D cost: Reducing IP protection below the maximal level (increasing  
above zero) increases average growth given the following inequality holds (e.g. if c is
large enough):
1  1
 (1 + )
>
1
cr2
Hence, growth is maximal for an intermediate level of IP protection in this case.
Proof. We only consider the linear case here and refer to the appendix for the proof in the
case of quadratic R&D costs. First note that there is no way to incentivize the monopolist
to engage in R&D if k > h. In order to get positive growth,   has to be chosen such that
Vn( )   c, which induces a Poisson arrival rate of the next incremental innovation of   =  m
in the case where k = h (state C). The expected time until an innovation occurs in state C is
given by 1 m , while the expected time between the granting of IP protection and its expiration
(during which there is no innovation) is given by 1  . The probability µ with which the economy
is in the competitive state C is therefore given by µ = 1/ m1/ +1/ m and as innovation only takes
place in this state, the average rate of growth is equal to  av = µ m =
  m
 m+ 
. This average
growth rate increases in   so that it is maximal for the maximally feasible level of   for
which Vn = c, that means for  ⇤ =  (1+ )c   r. Using assumption 1 and Vn(0) > c yields
 ⇤ > 0.
Decreasing IP protection has two countervailing e↵ects: First, it limits the innovator’s
appropriability of the surplus created by innovation, as his monopoly power is terminated
earlier. Second, when IP protections expires more quickly, the economy spends more time in
a state in which a higher innovation rate prevails. The net e↵ect is undetermined in general.
3.2 Social welfare
Limited appropriability of incremental surplus is often the reason for growth being ine -
ciently low. Up to now the discounted total surplus gain of an innovation is given by 1r ,
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which is equal to the incremental profit of the innovator given that there is full IP protection
(  = 0) and given that the interest rate is equal to the social discount rate. Although R&D
investment increases when IP protection expires due to higher returns from the reestablish-
ment of exclusivity, this additional R&D spending is wasteful considering that it would not
have been necessary had the IP protection not expired. Hence, we expect that as long as
exclusivity is welfare enhancing, full IP protection should be optimal under a utilitarian wel-
fare function. Only in the case where exclusivity is socially harmful it may be e cient to
reduce IP protection in order to destroy exclusivity from time to time14.
Let us now augment the model to capture the case of the innovator being able to only
partially extract the surplus, or if there are positive spillovers to other firms and markets
which rely on similar technologies. Then there is under-investment in R&D compared to the
socially e cient level under full IP protection15. Let us denote expected welfare (discounted
gross consumer surplus minus discounted R&D costs) when the IP protection on the newest
good k is enforced by ⌦e(k) and expected welfare in the case where there is no IP protection
for good k by ⌦n(k) . Then, the discounted gross welfare gain of an innovation is given by
⌦i(k + 1)   ⌦i(k) =  r with     1 indicating the extent to which the social rate of return
exceeds the private rate of return to innovation16. Using this shortcut we try to capture the
above mentioned reasons due to which a mismatch between social and private rate of return
can result. In such a setting, boosting investment by reducing IP protection may be socially
14Other policies like outlawing product di↵erentiation seem to be a better tool to remove this ine ciency.
However, such measures might not be feasible, because it is di cult the tell apart conspicuous consumption
from ordinary product di↵erentiation.
15Another reason due to which R&D incentives might be reduced below the socially e cient level might be
that, due to financial frictions, the interest rate r0 at which innovators discount lies above the discount rate
r that consumers and the social planner use.
16A simple way of endogenizing   > 1 is to think about an innovation being composed of two components:
The first component increases agents’ utility by 1 (from k to k + 1). The second part of the innovation is
realized only with probability ⌘ 2 (0, 1] and leads to an additional marginal improvement (in utility terms)
of all generations of the good by ↵ > 0. Only the first component of the innovation can be protected by
IPRs. The second component falls immediately into the public domain. We also assume that it is impossible
to hide the second component of the innovation when the first one is marketed. In the smart-phone market
we see a lot of this kind of innovation. A next generation device comes with improved software (which is
itself protected by copyright and patents), improved hardware (sometimes protected by patents), and with
a new way of using the device. The latter kind of innovation is most often not covered by IPRs. Ideas like
the introduction of an app store on mobile phones or the addition of automatic synchronization (of contacts,
music, files,. . . ) across a variety of di↵erent devices are not protected at all, and hence can and are imitated
very quickly (e.g. iPhone versus Android versus Windows Phone . . . ).
In terms of our model these additional components ↵ of the innovation do not change (private) innovation
incentives, if we assume that they become available for free for all previous generations of the quality good.
Then, neither innovation incentives nor the incentives for product di↵erentiation change. The price (and profit)
for the newest good k if consumed by both types of agents stays p = k   h. Under product di↵erentiation
prices remain at pH = k+  h for good k sold to high-type agents, and pL = k 1 h for good k 1 bought
by low-type ones. In either case incremental profits are equal to 1, while social returns from innovation are
given by   > 1 where   := 1 + ⌘↵.
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e cient17. We summarize and proof this conjecture in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose that discounted gross welfare gains of an innovation are given by  r .
Imperfect IP protection is optimal if either the instantaneous welfare loss from exclusivity is
large enough (case i) or if   is large enough and if average growth is increased by reducing IP
protection below the maximal level (case ii). If exclusivity (weakly) increases static welfare,
then perfect IP protection is optimal if   = 1. In the case of quadratic R&D costs we need
the additional assumptions that the taste for exclusivity   and the cost parameter c are large
enough to obtain the result that imperfect IP protection can be optimal in case ii.
Proof. Again we refer to the appendix for the case of quadratic R&D costs. Consider the
non-trivial18 case Vn(0) > c > Ve(0). From the discussion above we know that the innovation
rate is given by  m when IP protection has expired (as long as     ⇤) and by zero otherwise.
From this we can derive social welfare from the usual arbitrage conditions:
r⌦e(k) = We(k) +  (⌦n(k)  ⌦e(k))
r⌦n(k) = Wn(k) +  m(⌦e(k + 1)  ⌦n(k)  c)
whereWe(k) = k+we (Wn(k) = k+wn) denotes instantaneous welfare in the case of exclusive
(nonexclusive) consumption. Solving each equation for ⌦i(k), plugging the second equation
into the first one, and using the fact that the incremental social gain from an innovation is
given by ⌦i(k + 1)  ⌦i(k) =  r we get
⌦e(k) =
1
r
⇢
r +  m
r +  m +  
We(k) +
 
r +  m +  
Wn(k) +
 
r +  m +  
 m
✓
 
r
  c
◆ 
.
17Another well known reason for limiting IP protection is that the social planner may want to increase the
adoption of the innovation in the population, i.e. allow a higher number of consumers to benefit from the
innovation compared to the monopoly. In this model the welfare implications of the exclusion of low-type
agents from the consumption of the most recent good depend on parameter values. When we consider another
group of “very low”-type agents without a taste for exclusivity with utility UV (k) = "k with " 2 (0, 1), we
can show along the lines of the proof of proposition 6 that for low enough " the monopolist would always
exclude this group from consumption. In this situation a social planner might choose imperfect IPRs in order
to let “very low”-type agents benefit from innovation. In contrast to models without a taste for exclusivity
imperfect IPRs potentially allow for a double dividend: Lower IPRs may boost investment, which can be
socially e cient, as the monopolist does not take into account benefits of innovation for “very low”-type
agents.
18If c > Vn(0) there is no growth independent of IP policy. When c < Ve(0), we have to consider two cases:
When exclusivity increases static welfare, the optimal   is zero, as destroying exclusivity is bad and does not
even boost investment. In the opposite case where exclusivity decreases static welfare we can at least choose
IP protection  ˜ > 0 such that investment in both states is still profitable, i.e. for which Ve( ˜) = c. Then,
growth is still equal to  m but from time to time exclusivity is destroyed and this increases static welfare.
Whether an even lower IP protection is optimal (giving up growth in order to make the state in which there
is no exclusive consumption more likely) then depends on the parameter values.
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The derivative with respect to   is
@⌦e
@ 
(k) =
1
r
r +  m
(r +  m +  )2
⇢
(wn   we) +  m
✓
 
r
  c
◆ 
.
From this we immediately see that the optimal IP protection is  ⇤ or   = 1 (a corner
solution) when (wn  we) >   m
 
 
r   c
 
. If the inequality is not satisfied, then the optimal
IP policy is   = 0. The inequality is satisfied when either  , the relative social over private
return from investment, is large enough, or when the welfare gains from destroying exclusivity
(wn we) are large enough. In the case where the inequality holds and where we   wn,  ⇤ is
the preferred policy as in this case intertemporal utility is lower for   =1 than in the case
where   = 0 (⌦e(  = 0) =
k+we
r > ⌦e(  = 1) = k+wnr ). The optimal policy is also given
by  ⇤ if   is large enough (and if (wn   we) >   m
 
 
r   c
 
), as then ⌦e( ⇤) is larger than
⌦e(  = 0) and ⌦e(  =1) due to the fact that there is no growth and consequently no social
return from innovation in the last two cases.
Due to the composition e↵ect a large taste for exclusivity together with a high sensitivity
of marginal R&D cost is necessary to create strong enough growth augmenting e↵ects in
order to increase welfare for lower IP protection in the quadratic cost case. In the linear cost
case these properties are present automatically due to the bang-bang of investment levels in
the di↵erent states.
4 Leapfrogging
In the previous section we have studied the case of a monopoly innovator. Now we consider
the other polar case, where the incumbent (the previously successful innovator) cannot in-
novate any more, but where a new innovator enters19. The R&D technology of the entering
innovators is the same as in the case of the monopoly innovator discussed before. Innovation
still takes place incrementally in the sense that innovation step k can be brought about only
after good k   1 has been developed, but we assume that innovation k does not infringe on
any intellectual property covering good k   1 or earlier. In order to simplify the analysis it
is again assumed that the IP protection for all existing goods simultaneously expires with
19In the case of constant returns to R&D, the analysis is the same if there is free entry into R&D but if the
incumbent is not capable of doing follow-on R&D. We therefore need to assume that innovation is only be
brought about by new innovators, but not by incumbents. On the one hand this is restrictive when the same
R&D technology could in principle be also used by the incumbent. On the other hand, incumbent innovation
is not always profitable. One can show that obtaining more than a two-step lead is never profitable in the
case of constant returns to R&D. In some competition regimes between owners of di↵erent versions of the
good incumbent innovation is not profitable at all. A full treatment of this issue is left for a future extension.
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hazard rate  . Hence, when the most recent good developed is k and the good with the
highest quality that is in the public domain is denoted by h, all goods with index h < i  k
are also protected by IPRs and their number is stochastic and given by the number of innova-
tions that have occurred since IP protection has expired the last time. There are therefore a
plethora of possible configurations of ownership of all previous technologies. In the following
we consider only such competition regimes between owners of the di↵erent versions of the
good which allow us to reduce the number of states of the economy to the following three:
1. The IP protection of all goods has expired. Zero prices for all goods, and zero profits
for all parties.
2. Only the IP protection for product k has not expired: Product k   1 is o↵ered by the
competitive fringe. The innovator only sells to high-type agents (by assumption 1).
Per period profits for the (most recent) innovator are ⇡HC = (1 + ) .
3. IP protection for products k   1 and k have not expired20: We denote profits for the
(most recent) innovator by ⇡H , and incumbent’s profits by ⇡L. We assume ⇡HC > ⇡L,
which always holds in the competition regimes that we study below.
Using this abstraction of the per-period behavior, we can discuss the implications of IPR
policy without dealing with the concrete intra-period competition regime employed (various
specific competition regimes are then considered in the next subsection). The incentives of
entrants to invent good k depend on whether good k 1 is still under IP protection or not, as
this determines whether profits for entering innovators are given by ⇡H or by ⇡HC . However,
we stick to competition regimes in which entrants do not care about whether good k   2
is protected or not as this good is not sold anyway once good k is introduced. Profits for
selling goods already superseded by two or more higher quality goods are considered to be
zero. In the following we restrict attention to stationary equilibria, and disregard cycling
equilibria which may also occur in leapfrogging models. Furthermore, we provide results for
the general setting (without specifying intra-period competition) only in the case of a linear
R&D cost function.
Proposition 4. In the leapfrogging case average growth is maximal for full IP protection if
⇡HC  ⇡H holds. In the other case where ⇡HC > ⇡H , average growth may be maximal for
an intermediate strength of IP protection under a linear R&D technology.
20Potentially the IP protection of even more goods may not have expired. We consider only competition
regimes between innovators, where this fact does not influence the innovator’s and the incumbent’s profits.
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Proof. We relegate the treatment of the quadratic R&D cost case to the appendix. Let us
denote the innovation rate that the entrant innovator chooses when the currently newest
version of the good is under IP protection by  P . Taking IPR policy   as given, the value
of having IP protection on good k   1 (when good k is by assumption also protected by IP)
is given by VL =
⇡L
r+ + P
, which can be derived by employing the usual arbitrage argument.
Note that  P is also the replacement rate for incumbents. The gross value21 of developing
good k can then be derived from the arbitrage condition
rVi = ⇡i    Vi    P (Vi   VL) (1)
where i can either be H or HC and where again the replacement rate is given by  P .
Therefore, we obtain
Vi =
⇡i
r +   +  P
+
 P⇡L
(r +   +  P )2
. (2)
Note that Vi decreases in  P and  . Given good k is under IP protection, the constant
returns to R&D require that the zero profit condition VH = c is met in equilibrium (in case
R&D is profitable at all), which pins down22  P given  
 P ( ) =
⇡H + ⇡L   2(r +  )c+
p
[2(r +  )c  ⇡H   ⇡L]2   4(r +  )c[(r +  )c  ⇡H ]
2c
(3)
which we will need later on. We immediately obtain that VHC  c if and only if ⇡HC  ⇡H .
Given that the currently newest version of the good is in the public domain, the innovation
rate is consequently given by   =  m if ⇡HC > ⇡H , while it is given by   = 0 if ⇡HC < ⇡H .
If there is IP protection on the currently newest version of the good so that ⇡i = ⇡H , the
innovation rate is given by   =  P .
Therefore, average growth is always maximal for full IP protection if ⇡HC < ⇡H , as the
expiration of IPRs would lead to a complete stop of innovation in this case (The value of
an innovation would be too low, because inventors expect fast replacement due to the fact
that replacement is more profitable when the innovation of the incumbent is protected by an
IPR).
In the case where ⇡HC > ⇡H average growth may be maximal for an intermediate strength
of IP protection as there is again the composition e↵ect due to which the expiration of IPRs
increases the innovation rate from from  P to  m. In order to analyze this setting we need to
21Without taking R&D cost into account.
22The proof involves solving the quadratic equation VH = c for  . Only the larger of the two solutions, can
be positive due to the monotonicity of VH in  . The term under the square-root is positive as long as R&D
is profitable at all, i.e. c  ⇡H/(r +  ).
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consider two subcases: If ⇡Hr < c, engaging in R&D can never be profitable as long as there
are still IPRs which have not expired, so that  P = 0 in this case. Hence, average growth is
the same as in the monopoly case and by the same argument as in the proof of proposition
2, the optimal IP protection is given by  ⇤ and the respective average growth rate is  ⇤. But
when ⇡Hr > c, innovation stays profitable when the IP protection of at least one good has
not expired. First we compute the average growth rate of the economy, which is given by
the sum of the probabilities that the economy stays in a certain state times the respective
R&D rates:
 av =
1/ m
1/  + 1/ m
 m +
1/ 
1/  + 1/ m
 p =
 m(  +  p)
  +  m
The total derivate of average growth with respect to the degree of IP protection   (i.e.
considering the fact that  p is a function of  ) is negative:
d av
d 
=
 m
  +  m
 ⇡Lp
A
+
  m(  +  p( ))
(  +  m)2
< 0
where A denotes the positive expression inside the square bracket in equation (3). Hence, in
this case full IP protection (  = 0) is optimal again.
Intuitively one might suspect that ⇡HC should be smaller than (or at most equal to) ⇡H ,
because there is more competition in state 2 compared to state 3 in the market for good
k   1 which should also bring down prices and thus profits for good k. Hence, one would
expect that full IP protection should be the growth maximizing policy in the leapfrogging
case. Below we find that this is what happens in most cases but that there are also (rather
exotic) competition regimes in which ⇡HC > ⇡H holds (see Appendix D).
Proposition 5. Suppose that ⇡HC  ⇡H . In the leapfrogging case, full IP protection is
optimal if investment is socially e cient and exclusivity does not decrease welfare. A neces-
sary requirement for limited IP protection to be optimal is that either the welfare loss from
exclusivity is su ciently large or that growth is socially wasteful enough.
Proof. For the convex R&D technology see the appendix again. If ⇡HC < ⇡H , innovation
stops in case IP protection has expired. Hence, imperfect IP protection can only be optimal
if investment is socially ine cient or exclusivity decreases welfare. Now consider the case
⇡HC = ⇡H . In this setting, the value of an innovation is given by VH(= VHC), independently
of whether the currently newest generation of the good is IP protected or not, as marginal
profits and the rate of replacement are the same in both cases ( H =  HC =  P ). We can
therefore use the zero profit condition VH = c in order to derive  P like in (3). Using the
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same technique as in the proof of proposition 3 we can determine discounted welfare given
 :
⌦e(k) =
1
r
⇢
r +  p
r +  p +  
We(k) +
 
r +  p +  
Wn(k) +  p
✓
 
r
  c
◆ 
We note that @ p@  =  1  2⇡LpA < 0 (where A denotes again the positive expression inside the
square bracket in equation (3)) and use this to simplify the derivative of welfare with respect
to  :
@⌦e
@ 
(k) =
1
r
⇢
r +  p     @ p@ 
(r +  p +  )2| {z }
:=B
(wn   we) + @ p
@ 
✓
 
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By observing that the term B is positive and @ p@  is negative, we see that if innovation is
e cient ( r > c) and exclusivity is not welfare decreasing (we > wn), increasing   decreases
welfare. Hence, full IP protection is optimal. Limited IP protection being (strictly) optimal
requires that @⌦e@  (k) > 0 for some   > 0. This implies that either exclusivity decreases
welfare or innovation is socially wasteful.
The main di↵erence from the monopoly case is that imperfect IP protection is only used to
reduce growth. Proposition 4 already hinted at this result. When ⇡HC  ⇡H , the destruction
of exclusivity cannot be used to boost investment like in the case of a monopoly innovator.
On the other hand, innovation may be ine ciently high under leapfrogging, because every
new innovator can reap the exclusivity premium, i.e. due to business stealing. The social
planner may therefore use limited IP protection to shut down incentives for excessive growth.
4.1 Innovator may sell generation k   1 product as well
Consider the case where the innovator may not only sell quality level k of the good, but
also the good with quality level k   1 (e.g. a damaged version of good k). While this may
seem a bit awkward, it simplifies the analysis a lot as we will see in the following section
where we relax this assumption. For certain industries being able to sell lower-end versions
of the top quality product seems to be feasible. For example Apple is selling not only the
newest incarnation of the iPhone, but also the previous version updated with the most recent
software.
Per-period profits for innovators starting from a situation where all IPRs have expired
are given by ⇡HC =  (1+ ), which has already been derived in the section on the monopoly
case. Now suppose that the IP protection for quality levels k and k   1 have not expired. If
the innovator decides to serve the whole market, Bertrand competition with the incumbent
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brings his price for good k and his profit down to 1 (for any higher price p the incumbent
could just undercut the innovator and take the whole market making a positive profit, by
e.g. charging (p   1)/2 > 0). Suppose now that we have a separating equilibrium, where
low-type agents buy good k   1 and high-type agents good k. Denote the equilibrium price
charged by the incumbent for good k   1 by pL and the one charged by the innovator for
good k by pH . Furthermore, the innovator also sells good k   1 at price p˜L. Bertrand
competition necessitates pL = 0 = p˜L, because any positive price charged by the incumbent
would be undercut by the innovator (undercutting the price for good k   1 by a marginal
amount guarantees the demand of all low-type customers, while it requires at most a marginal
adjustment of the price for high-type agents). Hence, the equilibrium price charged for good
k 1 is zero and for good k it is given by 1+ , which is the highest price at which high-type
agents prefer not to switch to consuming good k   1 over consuming good k exclusively. No
deviation from these prices by any party is profitable. Thus, we have derived that profits in
state 3 are given by
⇡L = 0
⇡H =  (1 + ) .
Thus, the requirements of propositions 4 and 5 are fulfilled in this case, because we get that
⇡H = ⇡HC > ⇡L.
4.2 Innovator may only sell generation k product
Now we relax the assumption that the innovator can also sell good k 1 after having developed
good k. Treatment of state 2 stays the same. It seems natural to engage in the same procedure
of searching for a pure-strategy equilibrium in the price game in state 3. Unfortunately such
a search is in vain, as one can show that no such pure-strategy equilibrium exists. For the
proof see appendix B.exist.
When no equilibrium in pure-strategies exists, the next step is to look for mixed-strategy
equilibria. We refrain from doing so, because it leads to ex-post regret about the prices set by
the innovator and the incumbent. In reality it is easy to quickly adjust prices, which erodes
the credibility of an equilibrium concept which requires that parties stick to (ex-post) clearly
bad choices. Hence, we employ another way out and consider other equilibrium concepts.
We consider Cournot competition first and then the simple but clearly unrealistic case of
perfect price discrimination. In the appendix we discuss sequential equilibria of the original
price game, which su↵er from the same ex-post regret issue as the mixed-strategy approach
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to the original price game, but at least yield an equilibrium in pure strategies and serve
as an example where ⇡HC > ⇡H may hold. We only discuss the equilibrium in state 3 as
pHC = 1 +  and ⇡HC =  (1 + ) always prevails in state 2.
4.2.1 Cournot competition
As stated above we consider the case where products k and k   1 with non-expired
IP protection are owned by di↵erent firms. W.l.o.g. we can restrict our attention to
qL, qH 2 {0, , 1    , 1}. We apply the following selection criterion: When multiple prices
are compatible with a certain strategy combination, then prices maximizing industry profits
are chosen. We add another requirement, which is that ⇡H and ⇡L should be independent of
the level of most recently developed quality k.
First consider the best-response of the owner of product k:
1. Case qL = 1: Product owner k   1 tries to sell to all customers. If product owner k
decides to do the same, the price pH for product k is equal to 1 and respective profits
are given by ⇡H = 1. In case he decides to only serve high-type agents, prices are given
by pH = 1+  and pL = 0. The innovator’s profits equal ⇡H = 1+  > 1 in this case.
Thus, the innovator’s best-response is to serve only high-type agents, i.e. qrH(1) =  .
2. Case qL = 1   : Like in case before if the innovator wants to serve the whole market,
the price pH for his product is equal to 1 and thus also his profits. If he serves only the
high-type agents, the price for the innovator’s product equals pH = pL + 1 +  given
the incumbents price pL   0. Respective profits are given by ⇡H =  pL + (1 + )   
(1 + )  > 1. Again qrH(1) =  . Note that there is a multiplicity of prices which are
compatible with the quantities supplied in this case.
3. Case qL = 0: The best-response of the innovator is to serve only high-types. But then
this strategy profile can never by an equilibrium, because the incumbent could make a
positive profit by serving low-type agents.
Given that the innovator always wants to serve only high-type agents, we only have to find
the innovator’s best-response to this strategy in order to find the equilibrium. Thus suppose
that the innovator supplies   units of good k. Notice that the incumbent can never drive
the innovator out of the market, because he is selling the inferior product. Hence, trying to
serve all customers (qL = 1) leads to (a price of pL = 0 and) zero incumbent’s profits. On
the other hand - as explained above - serving only low-type agents (qL = 1  ) yields profits
(1   )pL where pL   0.
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Summing up, we have only one candidate for an equilibrium: qL = 1     and qH =  .
Note that the behavior of the owners of previous generation of the good is irrelevant for
the equilibrium outcome, as their technology is never consumed (in or out of equilibrium).
Hence, we have a unique equilibrium in pure strategies in the Cournot game. The remaining
problem is, that equilibrium prices are only tied down by the selection criterion23: p⇤L = 1
and p⇤H = 2 + . The respective profits are given by
⇡L = (1   )
⇡H =  (2 + ) .
We get that ⇡H > ⇡HC > ⇡L, hence propositions 4 and 5 apply.
4.2.2 Perfect price discrimination
Let us assume that firms can observe the type of the buyers and perfectly price discriminate
among them. While this assumption is clearly not very appealing (as it assumes that there
are no secondary markets and that only firms are able to observe the types while consumers
are not, so that they still need to signal their type with consumption) it leads to a simple
solution and might provide some insights: A pure strategy equilibrium of the following form
exists: the entrant charges pH(k) = 1 +   to the high types and charges an infinite price
to the low-type agents. The incumbent charges pH(k   1) = 0 to the high types and price
pL(k   1) = 1 to the low-type agents. The seller of generation k   2 of the good charges
pL(k 2) = 0 and does not sell in equilibrium. Profits are given by ⇡H = ⇡HC =  (1+ ) > 1
and ⇡L = 1    . Again the requirements for propositions 4 and 5 are fulfilled. Although
perfect price discrimination is possible and production costs are zero, the entrant does not
want to sell to the low types due to the interdependence of preferences and willingness’ to
pay. As prices for both groups can be set independently, the incumbent can decrease the
price for the high types to zero without reducing the price for low types, which leads to a
stable equilibrium.
incumbents always get profits ⇡L = (1   )⇧. In this case, full IP protection maximizes
growth if  (1 +  (1 + ) >  (1 + ) while an intermediate strength of IP protection may
maximize average growth in case  (1 +  (1 + )) <  (1 + ).
23Note that the optimal IPR policy does not depend on this selection!
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Wrap-up of the leapfrogging case without damaged versions
We have seen that in most important case of Cournot competition (and in most other cases)
⇡HC  ⇡H prevails, which implies that full IP protection always maximizes growth, which
is in contrast with the results from the case of a monopoly innovator in section 3 where
limited IP protection was optimal for considerable parameter ranges. The welfare optimizing
policy can still be to limit IP protection, but unlike in the monopoly case this is not to boost
growth. On the contrary limiting excessive growth because of excessive incentives to invest
due to the taste for exclusivity may be one of the motives for imperfect IP protection. The
other reason is to reduce welfare decreasing e↵ects of exclusivity, like it was already the case
under a monopoly innovator.
In appendix D we show that under a sequential price game we may get that ⇡HC >
⇡H . Then it is possible that average growth is maximal for an intermediate strength of
IP protection. We do not study the optimal welfare policy in this rather exotic case, but
conjecture that growth augmenting e↵ects of limited IP protection may be welfare increasing
as well like in the monopoly case.
5 Di↵erences in willingness to pay and network e↵ects
Let us now look at the more general case where utility of low types is given by UL(k) = k
and that of high types by UH(k) = ✓k +  in the case where they are exclusive consumers
and by UH(k) = ✓k if they consume the same quality as the low types. It is assumed that
✓ > 1 so that the willingness to pay for quality is higher for high than for low types. We now
consider the general case in which   can be either positive or negative, where   < 0 can
be interpreted as a network e↵ect due to which the high types get additional utility in the
case where they consume the same good as the low types (which is therefore the opposite of
a taste for exclusivity)24.
5.1 Monopoly case
Suppose the newest version of the good is generation k and that a competitive fringe supplies
generation h  k.
Proposition 6. Assuming that  ✓ > max {1; 1    }, the monopolist sells the newest good
k to the high types, while the low types consume the competitive fringe good h. Profits are
24Network e↵ects can for example arise for software or video games if users can only interact with other
users who consume the same generation of the product.
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given by ⇡ =  ✓(k   h) +   .
Proof. Given that the monopolist sells generation k exclusively to the high types, the question
is which generation l with h  l < k he sells to the low types. For simplicity, let us think of
l as a continuous variable (the results then also apply to the case where l is discrete. The
continuous case can be thought of as a generalization where damaged versions of goods can
be supplied). In a separating equilibrium the monopolist sets prices pH for good k and pL
for good l under the constraints that the high types do not want to buy good l (IC H) and
that the low types are willing to buy good l (PC L). We therefore obtain:
IC H: ✓k +   pH   ✓l   pL
PC L: l   pL   h
As usual, both constraints must bind25 so that we get pL = l h and pH = ✓(k l)+l h+ .
Profits are then given by:
⇡ =  pH + (1   )pL =  ✓(k   l) + l   h+   
Maximizing with respect to l we obtain the corner solution l = h if  ✓ > 1. Profits in this
case are given by ⇡ =  ✓(k h)+   and are larger than the pooling profits ⇡P = k h (that
arise if l = k) if   >  (k h)( ✓ 1)  . This condition holds for any k   h + 1 if  ✓ > 1     .
Consequently, the monopolist sells generation k to the high types and does not sell to the
low types at all if  ✓ > max {1; 1    }.
The monopolist therefore never engages in product di↵erentiation if the willingness to
pay ✓ of the high types is large enough. He either sells the newest good k to all agents or
only to high-types26. According to proposition 6, marginal profits are given by  ✓ if k > h
and by  (✓ +  ) if h = k. If   > 0, marginal profits and the value of an innovation are
therefore again higher in the case where IP protection has expired. However, the opposite
holds if   < 0 and if  (✓+ ) > 1. In this case, there are positive network e↵ects which are,
however, only realized in the case where IP protection has expired as the monopolist finds it
25To show this one can use the same argument as in appendix C.
26Given there is a taste for exclusivity (  > 0) and given that ✓ < 1  there are again cases where the
monopolist finds it optimal to sell generation k to the high types and generation k   1 > h to the low types.
In this case, the monopolist excludes the low types from consuming the newest good only in order to be able
to extract the exclusivity premium from the high types, but not because the willingness to pay of the low
types is so low that it is not profitable to sell to them at all. In this case, the analysis is similar to the one
before where there are no di↵erences in the willingness to pay. It should be noted that in the case where
  = 0 (and also if   < 0), the monopolist never engages in quality di↵erentiation, a result which is shown to
also hold for more general utility functions in Appendix C.
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profitable to sell the newest version of the good exclusively to the high types if k > h. For
  < 0, marginal profits are therefore higher if k > h than in the case where IP protection has
expired and where k = h. The reason for this is that in the latter case the innovator has to
incentivize the high types to stop consuming the public domain good which brings positive
network benefits, while in the first case the high types already consume an IP protected good
which does not provide network benefits so that the monopolist does not need to o↵er the
newest version at a discount. The e↵ects of IP protection on growth can be summarized as
follows:
Proposition 7. Assume that  ✓ > max {1; 1    } holds. Imperfect IP protection maxi-
mizes growth in the following cases:
1. Linear R&D costs: For Vn(0) =
 (✓+ )
r > c > Ve(0) =
 ✓
r , growth is maximal for an
intermediate level of IP protection
 ⇤ =
 (✓ + )
c
  r > 0 .
The corresponding average growth rate is given by
 ⇤ =
 ⇤ m
 m +  ⇤
.
2. Quadratic R&D cost: Reducing IP protection below the maximal level (increasing  
above zero) increases average growth given that 1   ✓✓+    ✓ cr2 > 0. Hence, growth is
maximal for an intermediate level of IP protection in this case.
If   < 0, growth is always maximal for full IP protection (  = 0).
Proof. The same as in the proof of Proposition 2 , with the di↵erence that the value of
an innovation in the case of exclusivity (expired IPRs) is now given by Ve =
 ✓
r+  (Vn =
 (✓+ )
r+  ).
In the case of a taste for exclusivity (  > 0), the e↵ects of IP protection on growth are
therefore (qualitatively) the same as in the case without di↵erences in the willingness to pay.
The result that growth can be maximal for an intermediate strength of IP protection arises
due to the taste for exclusivity, as in the case where   = 0, simply allowing for di↵erences
in the willingness to pay does not lead to a di↵erence in marginal profits in the cases where
k > h and k = h27. In the case of network e↵ects where   < 0 (and  (✓ +  ) > 1) a
27In the case of perfect price discrimination and under the assumption that  (✓+ ) > 1+✓, the monopolist
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reduction of the strength of IP protection (an increase in  ) unambiguously reduces growth
through two e↵ects: it on the one hand reduces the value of an innovation Vi (with either
i = e or i = n) by reducing appropriability and on the other hand makes the state in which IP
protection has expired and in which innovation incentives are particularly low more likely28.
In this more general setting, the welfare analysis is somewhat more involved as the con-
sumption gap between high and low types can now be larger than one step. While exclusivity
that arises due to a one-step consumption gap might be socially desirable (if we > wn), in-
creasing the consumption gap beyond one step always decreases static welfare. Because of
this, IP protection leads to additional static distortions in this setting if the monopolist finds
it profitable to extend his lead relative to the competitive fringe beyond one step. These
distortions are larger, the larger the fraction 1     of excluded low type consumers is. In
the case of network e↵ects (  < 0), where exclusivity is socially harmful, there is the stan-
dard trade-o↵ that IP protection encourages innovation but implies static welfare losses. If
the latter are su ciently large, an intermediate strength of IP protection might maximize
intertemporal welfare.
5.2 Leapfrogging case
In this case there again does not exist a pure strategy equilibrium in the pricing game29.
In the case where the most recent entrant can sell damaged versions of good k that
resemble good k   1 and in which competition drives the price of good k   1 to zero, we get
pH = ✓+  and ⇡ =  (✓+ ) > 1, independently of whether the previous generation of the
good is protected by IPRs. Stronger IP protection therefore always increases growth like in
the case without di↵erences in the willingness to pay.
In the case of perfect price discrimination, a pure strategy equilibrium of the following
sells the newest generation k to the high types at price pH = ✓(k   h) +  and generation k   1 to the low
types at price pL = k   1  h. Once more marginal profits are higher if k = h than in the case where k > h
so that average growth might be maximal for an intermediate strength of IP protection again.
28In the case of linear R&D costs, there are no incentives to innovate in the case where IP protection has
expired if  (✓+ )r < c. Consequently, positive growth can only occur if IP protection is granted for an infinite
duration (  = 0). In the case of quadratic R&D costs, it is easy to see in the proof of Proposition 2 that
@ av
@  < 0 if  e >  n.
29The optimal response of the leader is to set pH = pL + ✓ +  if generation k   1 is sold to the low types
and pH = pL + ✓ if generation k  1 would be sold exclusively. As long as pL > 1+ " (note that good k  2 is
sold at price zero) the follower can grant exclusivity of good k  1 and always wants to attract demand of the
high types by undercutting his price a bit (as the follower would not sell to anyone otherwise). As the leader
responds by cutting pH correspondingly so that the high types never buy from the follower, the follower starts
reducing pLto or below 1 in order to at least sell to the low types. But as long as pL > 0, the follower always
wants to undercut the price a little in order to sell to both instead of only one group so that pLwould go to
zero. This can, however, not be an equilibrium as the follower can make positive profits by selling only to the
low types if the leader only sells to the high types.
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form exists given that  (✓+ ) >  ✓+1  : the entrant charges pH(k) = ✓+  to the high
types and charges an infinite price to the low types. The incumbent charges pH(k   1) = 0
to the high types and price pL(k   1) = 1 to the low types. The seller of generation k   2
of the good charges pL(k   2) = 0 and does not sell in equilibrium. Profits are given by
⇡H = ⇡HC =  (✓+ ) >  ✓+1   (where the last inequality has to hold in order to ensure
that the entrant only wants to sell exclusively to the high types) and ⇡L = 1    . Hence
again, growth is maximal for full IP protection.
6 Conclusion
While several articles have analyzed the e↵ects of intellectual property protection in a setting
of cumulative innovation, they abstract from the possibility that consumers might care about
whether they are the exclusive consumers of a good. We allow for such a taste for exclusivity
(and also the opposite, network e↵ects) and show that its presence can in some cases reverse
the e↵ects that IP protection has on innovation. In our model, innovation continuously
increases the quality of the good. However, similar results could also be obtained in a model
where the utility (k) that agents derive from consuming a certain good depreciates over
time so that innovation mainly restores an initial level of utility but does not lead to a
continuous increase in quality. Especially in the area of fashion such a broader interpretation
of the quality-ladder setting seems useful, as innovation not necessarily leads to products
of higher quality but mainly to the replacement of old trends (of which people got tired)
by new trends. When applied to the context of fashion30, the analysis suggests that strong
protection against imitation granted by IPRs (or lead time) is likely to encourage innovation
and to accelerate the fashion cycle when new trends are set by firms and designers who are
not involved in (have no stakes in) the current trend. Contrary to that, our results indicate
that innovation incentives might be largest under imperfect IP protection (or appropriability
more generally) if there is a monopoly innovator. The latter situation might not only arise
if just one incumbent firm is capable of doing R&D, but also if consumers only use goods
of well established brands (e.g. designer clothing) for signaling, so that rival firms cannot
easily compete for the market by introducing new goods themselves. In such cases, making
it easier for rivals to copy the status goods of established brands (by for example weakening
the enforcement of trademark protection) might induce those brands to innovate more and
to introduce new goods more often. Whether such “innovation”would be socially e cient is,
30Our model is clearly very stylized and does not capture a lot of features that are specific to the fashion
industry. For a more detailed description of the innovation process and the role of IP in fashion, see Raustiala
and Sprigman (2006) and Hemphill (2009).
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however, not clear. While we have so far highlighted some basic insights, there are several
directions in which the paper could be extended: while we currently simply assume that
there is a monopoly innovator in one case and leapfrogging in the other, we intend to analyze
under which conditions also incumbents do (some) follow-on R&D if there is free entry into
R&D.
So far we have only modeled the strength of IP protection as the probability with which
innovators are protected against imitation. However, one could also analyze more general
IP policies like forward protection or a patentability requirement. Also IP/patent breadth
could be introduced in the following way: given that competitors can supply copied goods
that have higher production costs or a lower quality than the original, IP/patent breadth
can define a lower bound on these costs or an upper bound on the quality of those copies
for which entry is still allowed. As a result, there would be a limit pricing equilibrium and a
reduction in patent breadth would reduce the price that monopolists can maximally charge.
By limiting patent breadth, innovators could therefore be induced to sell the good at a lower
price to both groups instead of only selling to the high types.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of proposition 2 (quadratic R&D cost case). In the quadratic cost function case the
innovator chooses  e =
1
c(r+ ) and  n =
 (1+ )
c(r+ ) . First we compute average growth given the
innovation rates  n for the situation where IP protection for all goods has expired and  e
when the IP protection for at least one good has not expired:
 av =
1/ n
1/  + 1/ n
 n +
1/ 
1/  + 1/ n
 e =
 n(  +  e)
  +  n
(4)
From this we compute the derivative of  av with respect to changes in IP policy   (taking
into account that  e and  n depend on   as well):
@ av
@ 
=
 2n    n e + ( 2n +  n )@ e@  +  ( e +  )@ n@ 
(  +  n)2
In an interior maximum this expression has to be equal zero, which is very messy to solve.
Instead we evaluate this derivate for   = 0:
@ av
@ 
=

1  1
 (1 + )
 
  1
cr2
The first term in brackets is larger than zero by assumption 1. Hence, for c large enough the
whole expression is positive.
Proof of proposition 3 (quadratic R&D cost case). Denote by ⌦e(k) welfare (discounted
gross consumer surplus minus R&D cost) when the IPRs for good k have not expired and by
⌦n(k) when there is no IP protection for good k. The following arbitrage conditions hold:
r⌦e(k) = We(k) +  (⌦n(k)  ⌦e(k)) +  e(⌦e(k + 1)  ⌦e(k))  C( e)
r⌦n(k) = Wn(k) +  n(⌦e(k + 1)  ⌦n(k))  C( n)
Plugging the second equation into the first one and using the fact that the incremental social
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gain from an innovation is given by ⌦i(k + 1)  ⌦i(k) =  r , we can compute
⌦e(k) =
1
r
⇢
r +  n
r +  n +  | {z }
:=a
We(k) +
 
r +  n +  
Wn(k)
+
r +  n
r +  n +  

 e
 
r
  C( e)
 
| {z }
:=le
+
 
r +  n +  

 n
 
r
  C( n)
 
| {z }
:=ln
 
.
One can show that ⌦n(k) is just a positive a ne transformation of ⌦e(k), which allows us
to carry out all welfare considerations using welfare in the state where the IP protection for
at least the latest good has not expired.
First we compute the welfare di↵erence between imperfect (  > 0) and perfect (  = 0)
IP protection:
⌦e(k)  ⌦e(k,   = 0) = 1
r
[(1  a)(wn   we) + ale + (1  a)ln   l0]
where l0 =  e(0)
 
r
  C( e(0)) .
In the case where   = 1 (identical social and private returns from innovation) and where
wn   we  0 (exclusivity is socially desirable) we immediately get that full IP protection
is optimal: Destroying exclusivity would decrease social surplus, while at the same time at
least one of the two R&D rates would deviate from the optimal one  e(0). In order to be
able to look at more general cases, we compute the derivate of social welfare:
@⌦e
@ 
(k) =
1
r

@a
@ 
(we   wn) + @a
@ 
(le   ln) + a@le
@ 
+ (1  a)@ln
@ 
 
(5)
Inserting  e =
1
c(r+ ) and  n =
 (1+ )
c(r+ ) , we find that
@le
@  =    cr(r+ )2 + 1c2(r+ )3 and that
@ln
@  =    (1+ )cr(r+ )2 +  
2(1+ )2
c2(r+ )3 , while
@↵
@  =   (r+ n)(r+ n+ )2 . Inserting these terms into @⌦e@  (k) and
evaluating this derivative for   = 0 yields:
sign

@⌦e
@ 
(k,   = 0)
 
= sign

( (1 + ))(1  c + c2r2 )
+ cr2   2c2r2   cr
2( 2(1 + )2   1)
2
+ (wn   we)c3r4)
 
Given that exclusivity is su ciently harmful so that wn   we is su ciently large, the sign
of this derivative is positive so that reducing IP protection below the maximal level (  = 0)
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becomes optimal. When c is large, the sign of the derivative is equal to the sign of (wn we)
(terms in c3) and equal to the sign of (r( (1 + )  2)) (terms in c2) if wn = we. Therefore,
given that c is large, intertemporal welfare can be increased by marginally reducing IP
protection below the maximal value if either exclusivity is harmful (wn > we) or if wn = we
and if  (1+ ) > 2, where the latter condition implies that the taste for exclusivity must be
large enough. Given that   is large, the sign of the derivative @⌦e@  (k,   = 0) is equal to the
sign of  (1+ )(cr2 1) 2cr2, which is positive if   and c are su ciently large. Therefore,
reducing IP protection below the maximal level increases intertemporal welfare given that
the relative social over private return from innovation ( ) is large enough and given that also
  and c are su ciently large.
Proof of proposition 4 (quadratic R&D cost case). Denote the innovation rate by  H when
the latest good is still covered by IP protection and by  HC when all IP protection has
expired. Like in the case of linear costs  H is also the anticipated replacement rate resulting
from future innovation. We first show that the replacement rate  H is well defined given  ,
and decreasing in  . Given the anticipated innovation rate ' of future innovators and  , the
optimal response by the innovator facing an incumbent whose product is still covered by IP
protection is given by
 ˜(',  ) =
1
c

⇡H
r +   + '
+
'⇡L
(r +   + ')2
 
. (6)
This best response function is strictly decreasing in   and positive for   = 0. Hence, there
exists a unique solution  H( ) to the fixed-point problem ' =  ˜(',  ). The derivative of
 H with respect to   is negative, as can be seen by plugging in an checking the signs of the
derivative of the best-response function:
@ H
@ 
=
@ ˜
@ 
1  @ ˜@'
< 0
The following result will be useful in the following proposition:
@ H
@ 
=  
⇡L
c(r+ + H)2
  @ ˜@'
1  @ ˜@'
>  1
The equality can be derived by recognizing that @ ˜@' =
@ ˜
@ +
⇡L
c(r+ + H)2
. The inequality follows
from ⇡Lc(r+ + H)2 < 1 which can be derived from  H =  ˜( H ,  ) with a few rearrangements.
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Using equation (2) we immediately get that given ⇡HC  ⇡H the innovation rate when
the IP protection for all goods has expired is smaller or equal than the one in case when the
IP protection of at least one good has not expired:  HC   H for all  . Using the same
argument as before, we can determine average growth given  :
 av =
1/ HC
1/  + 1/ HC
 HC +
1/ 
1/  + 1/ HC
 H
Trivially, average growth is equal to  H(0) for full IP protection (  = 0). Suppose by
contradiction that average growth is larger for a positive  , i.e.  av( ) >  H(0). But  av is
a convex combination of  H and  HC . Hence,  H( ) >  H(0) has to hold, which contradicts
 H decreasing in  . Therefore,  H( )   H(0).
Proof of proposition 5 (quadratic R&D cost case). Before we start the actual proof, we need
to compute the derivative of the innovation rate when IP protection for all goods has expired,
which is given by  HC( ) =
1
c
h
⇡HC
r+ + H
+  H⇡L(r+ + H)2
i
. After some manipulations (and taking
into account that  H is a function of  ) we derive:
@ HC
@ 
=
1
c
24
⇣
⇡L
 H
r+ + H
  ⇡HC
⌘⇣
1 + @ H@ 
⌘
(r +   +  H)2
+
⇡L
⇣
@ H
@  (r +  )   H
⌘
(r +   +  H)3
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Using that @ H@  >  1 and ⇡HC > ⇡L implies that  HC is decreasing in   as well. After these
preparative steps we compute social welfare like in the proof of proposition 3:
⌦e(k) =
1
r
⇢
r +  HC
r +  HC +  | {z }
:=b
We(k) +
 
r +  HC +  
Wn(k)
+
r +  HC
r +  HC +  

 H
 
r
  C( H)
 
| {z }
:=lH
+
 
r +  HC +  

 HC
 
r
  C( HC)
 
| {z }
:=lHC
 
.
When   > 0 is socially optimal, i.e. we have an interior solution of the welfare maximization
problem, and thus the respective first order condition has to hold:
@⌦e
@ 
(k) =
1
r

@b
@ 
(we   wn) + @b
@ 
(lH   lHC) + b@lH@  + (1  b)
@lHC
@ 
 
= 0
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This is equivalent to
@b
@ 
[(lH   lHC) + (we   wn)] =  

b
@lH
@ 
+ (1  b)@lHC
@ 
 
.
By straight-forward computation and using the fact that  HC is decreasing in  , one can
show that the derivative of b w.r.t.   is negative.
Now suppose that we do not have excessive growth, i.e. that  H(0) is smaller than or
equal to the growth level  o which maximizes  
 
r   C( ). Hence,  H and  HC are smaller
than  o for all  . Then lH   lHC and @lHC@  , @lHC@  < 0 due to the concavity of   r   C( ).
Given that, the right-hand side of the equation is always positive. Furthermore lH   lHC   0
and @b@  < 0. The only way the equation can hold is if we < wn, i.e. when exclusivity is
welfare decreasing.
Suppose now that exclusivity is socially desirable, we   wn. Then either lH < lHC ,
@lH
@  > 0 or
@lHC
@  > 0 has to hold. This can only be the case (again due to the concavity of
  r   C( )) if growth is excessive, i.e. if  H(0) >  H >  0.
B Non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in section 4.2
When IPRs have expired or when only the newest generation of the good is protected by
an IPR, equilibria in pure strategies trivially exist. The problematic situation occurs when
IPRs on (at least) two successive innovations have not expired and are owned by di↵erent
firms. As a start we list all conditions that need to hold in a separating equilibrium. Like
before we denote by pH (pL) the price charged by the successful innovator (by the incumbent)
providing quality k (k  1). For high-type agents the constraint k+   pH   k  1  pL has
to hold, i.e. high-type agents choose to consume quality k in equilibrium. This condition is
equivalent to
pH  pL + 1 +  . (7)
The respective incentive compatibility constraint for low-type agents (they should prefer the
inferior quality good) is given by k   1  pL   k   pH or shorter:
pH   pL + 1 (8)
On the producer side the two firms have to find it optimal to stick to their own customer
base in equilibrium, i.e. given the other firm’s equilibrium behavior, they should not want to
attract customers of the other firm in equilibrium. For the successful innovator serving only
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high-type agents has to be optimal:
 pH   pL + 1 (9)
Analogously, serving only low-type agents has to be optimal for the incumbent firm:
(1   )pL   pH   (1 + ) (10)
On top of these conditions both types of agents should not want to buy a quality in the
public domain provided by the competitive fringe. Again we denote by h the highest quality
good, which is already in the public domain. The respective participation conditions are
given by
pL  k   1  h and pH  k   h . (11)
Given this preparation we can state and proof the following statement:
Proposition 8. When the IP protection of at least two goods have not expired and are owned
by di↵erent firms, no pure-strategy separating equilibrium exists in the price game.
Proof. Suppose that pL and pH are the prices charged in equilibrium to low-type and high-
type agents respectively. This implies that pL  k   1 or else low-type agents would not
consume. The innovator’s best response is to charge pL + 1 +  , which is feasible due to
equation (7). Thus, in equilibrium pH = pL+1+  has to hold, but a separating equilibrium
requires (among others) that condition (10) holds as well. But given pH = pL + 1 +  (10)
reduces to
(1   )pL   pL
which can only be true if pL = 0. So pL = 0 and pH = 1+  is the only viable candidate for
an equilibrium, leaving the incumbent with zero profits. But this leads to a contradiction,
because given pH = 1 +   the incumbent could charge min{ , 1} (taking into account
competition from product k  2). Low-type agents would still consume from the incumbent,
who would be able to make a positive profit. Thus, there exists a profitable deviation for the
incumbent from the only viable equilibrium candidate.
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C Quasi-linear preferences, unit consumption of a quality
good, and standard product di↵erentiation
In this section we study the question, whether a similar replacement e↵ect may be in place
in a model with standard product di↵erentiation. The answer to the question is no, because
in this setting a monopoly innovator always sell exclusively to high-type agents and let the
competitive fringe serve low-type agents.
Denote by UL(k) and UH(k) utility of low-type and high-type agents respectively. Assume
UH(k) > UL(k) for all k > 0, i.e. high-type agents have a higher willingness to pay which
is not related to exclusive consumption like in the rest of the paper. Suppose that the IP
protection of all goods up to and including quality level h have expired.
Consider first the case when k = h + 1, i.e. only the IP protection for product k has
not expired. First note that the price for good k   1 is zero, because it is provided by
the competitive fringe. To be in line with the rest of the paper we need an equivalent to
assumption 1:
Assumption 2. Suppose that the innovator only wants to sell exclusively to high-type agents,
i.e.
⇡HC =  [UH(k)  UH(k   1)] > UL(k)  UL(k   1) .
Note that this assumption is stronger than (i.e. implies) the single-crossing condition:
Consider arbitrary a > b:
UL(a)  UL(b) =
aX
j=b+1
UL(j)  UL(j   1) <
aX
j=b+1
 [UH(j)  UH(j   1)]
=  [UH(a)  UH(b)] < UH(a)  UH(b)
The first inequality hold due to assumption 2, the second one because   < 1.
Now suppose that only the IP protection up to quality level h < k   1 have expired.
Suppose that the innovator decides to serve quality h  m  k to high-type agents and
quality h  n  k to low-type ones. Furthermore, he chooses the respective prices pL and
pH in order to maximize profits ⇡H = (1  )pL+ pH . The following PC and IC constraints
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have to be taken into consideration in this maximization problem:
UH(m)  pH   UH(h)
UL(n)  pL   UL(h)
UH(m)  pH   UH(n)  pL
UL(n)  pL   UL(m)  pH
By using the IC constraint for high-type agents, the participation constraint of low-type
agents and single-crossing one can show that the participation constraint of the high-type
agents is superfluous. Using this, the usual argument31 yields that the IC constraint for high-
types has to be binding. But then single-crossing together with the binding IC constraint for
high-types implies that the IC constraint for low-types holds as well. Hence, we can conclude
that the PC constraint has to be binding as well32.
Thus, the innovator’s profit can be written as ⇡H = UL(l)   h +  [UH(m)   UH(l)].
From this one can see that l = h and m = k is optimal. Profits are increasing in m, so
maximal feasible m is optimal. Now suppose l > h, then for a quality level of l   1 for
low-type agents, the optimal respective price is UL(l   1) and the respective profit ⇡0H =
UL(l 1) h+ [UH(k) UH(l 1)]. But due to assumption 2 ⇡0H > ⇡H , which constitutes a
contradiction to l being the optimal quality level for low-type agents. Hence, we have proven
the following statement:
Proposition 9. An innovator would always sell the newest product to high-type agents exclu-
sively. In order to extract maximal surplus from high-type agents, he does not serve low-type
agents at all, who then consume the good provided by the competitive fringe.
From this we immediately get that incremental profits from innovation are independent
of h, the good with the most recently expired IP protection, and thus reducing IP protection
does not boost innovation, but on the contrary reduces returns from investments by earlier
IPR expiry and thus reduces the growth rate as well.
D Leapfrogging: Sequential equilibrium
We revisit the original price game in state 3 (i.e. after innovation k has materialized the IP
protection for technology k 1 has not already expired), but consider that the innovator and
31Proof by contradiction: Suppose it is not binding, then raising pH marginally would further improve
profits without violating any constraints.
32Applying the same type of proof by contradiction as before.
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incumbent move sequentially. Both possibilities are studied: The innovator moving first and
the incumbent moving first. As already noted before, the first mover experiences ex-post
regret, i.e. he would like to adapt his price after the other party has chosen its price. While
we share the concern that not being able to change the price ex-post is worrisome, there may
be justifications like an innovator communicating the price of the newly developed product
at big product launch event. After this announcement it may be more di cult to inform
customers about price cuts from the original price.
Competition with producers of product k   2 is not modeled explicitly, but could be
added as an additional stage in the sequential game, which would lead to a price of zero
of product k   2. This is what we take as given in the following. The arguments refer to
certain equation numbers of incentive compatibility constraints in the proof of non-existents
of a pure-strategy equilibrium of the simultaneous move game (appendix B).
D.1 Incumbent moves first
We are not presenting the details of the derivation, but just report the result that we get
⇡HC < ⇡H again, hence full IP protection maximizes average growth in this case.
D.2 Innovator moves first
The innovator has two choices: Selling to all consumers (profit = price = 1) or to sell
exclusively to high-type agents only. Consider the second case: The innovator has to ensure
that the incumbent does not have an incentive to serve the whole market. Depending on
parameters competition from product k   1 influences the equilibrium outcome:
• Case      :
Again we only report the result that ⇡HC < ⇡H and thus the optimal IP protection to
maximize growth is given by   = 0.
• Case   <  :
Equilibrium prices are given by pH =
 + 
  and pL = pH   1. Note that 1 < pH < 2
and 0 < pL < 1. Again it is obvious that (7) and (8) hold. Furthermore (10) binds
again (no greater pH is feasible). From this we get equilibrium profits:
⇡L =
(1   ) 
 
⇡H =  +  
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This time the innovator prefers to sell exclusively to high-type agents if and only if
    1     holds33. When the innovator prefers not to sell exclusively, ⇡HC > ⇡H
holds. Even under exclusivity it might happen, that per-period profits are higher for
the innovator when the IP protection for good k 1 has already expired. In both cases
limited IP protection may lead to the maximal growth rate.
33This seems to be a quite restrictive assumption, which can e.g. only hold if   > .5. One example where
it holds is for   = .5 and   = .6
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